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Abstract
Power grids are prone to failure. Time series of reliability measures such as
total power loss or energy not supplied can give significant account of the
underlying dynamical behavior of these systems, specially when the resulting
probability distributions present remarkable features such as an algebraic
tail, usually considered the footprint of self-organization and the existence
of critical points. In this paper, seven years (from 2002 to 2008) of Europe’s
transport of electricity network failure events have been analyzed and the
best fit for this empirical data probability distribution is presented. With the
actual span of available data and although there exists a moderate support
for the power law model, the relatively small amount of events contained in
the function’s tail suggests that causal factors other than self-organization
or a critical state might be significantly ruling these systems’ dynamics.
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1. Introduction
There has been in recent years an increasing awareness about infrastruc-
ture networks security and reliability [1, 2, 3]. Modern society’s functional
capacity relies on an optimal operation of infrastructure and information
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networks such as roads, railways, gas and oil pipes or Internet. Particularly
vital, and at the same time prone to failure, are electric power transmis-
sion networks. These are extremely complex engineered systems, composed
of multiple and interconnected elements, whose reliability depends both on
each component’s behavior and, at the same time, on the many different dy-
namical interactions that span over and rule the overall connectivity of the
system.
Although it is not always the case, a malfunction of a power transmission
system shows usually itself as a blackout. This is a direct consequence of
a cascading failure involving several of its composing and linking elements.
This fact turns the study of the details of failures in power transmission
networks from a traditional engineering point of view a hard task, if not an
impossible one most of the times. In order to reduce the inherent complexity
of this detailed approach, some new ways have been proposed in recent years.
One of them is that of ignoring the details of particular failures and to focus
on the study of global behaviors and dynamics of time series with approxi-
mate global models. Concepts such as criticality and self-organization have
been applied to characterize blackout data, suggesting that the frequency of
large blackouts is governed by non trivial distribution functions such as power
laws and, consequently, that power systems are designed and operated near
a critical point. (For a comprehensive review on this approach, see Ref.[4]
and references therein).
This paper analyses for the first time, and as far as we know, the statistics
of major electric transmission network events in the European power grid
from this aforementioned complex systems approach. Following essentially
the statistical analysis presented in Ref.[5], we estimate the basic parameters
of the power-law model, then calculate the goodness-of-fit between the data
and the power law and finally we compare the power law with alternative
hypotheses via a likelihood ratio test. The paper is organized as follows.
In section II European major events data is presented and explained. In
section III blackout data is analyzed. Finally, section IV summarizes our
main results.
2. UCTE major events data
European power network reliability data can be found in the Union for
the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) web page, publicly
available from 2002 onwards in monthly statistics format [6]. The UCTE
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is the association of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in continental
Europe and manages data from 24 different European countries. Due to
the complexity of events, sometimes involving more than one TSO, types of
interruptions in the network and short time given to gather this informa-
tion, UCTE major events data is somehow limited in its scope and does not
provide a fully detailed account of some events. It is, nonetheless,the best
documented source that has been found. For each major event, it summarizes
the following information:
• Country.
• Substations involved.
• Reason (R). Broadly classified into four groups: (1) overloads (also
calculated brakes), (2) failures (false operation, failure in protection
device or other element), (3) external (outside impacts and very ex-
ceptional weather and natural conditions) and (4) other or unknown
reasons.
• Energy Not Supplied (ENS). Measured in MWh, as loss of energy
from the consumption side.
• Total Loss of Power (TLP). Measured in MW, as loss of production
from the generation side.
• Restoration Time (RT). Measured in minutes. Note that since ENS
and TLP are measured from different sides, RT can not be assumed as
the ratio of ENS over TLP. It can be considered, therefore, an inde-
pendent reliability measure.
• Equivalent Time of Interruption (ETI). Defined as the duration
of an interruption in minutes multiplied by the energy not supplied
divided by the consumption for the last 12 months. Defined in this
way, the ETI allows a direct comparison between TSOs in terms of
interruptions that occurred during a year.
From 2002 to 2008, both years inclusive, 908 major events have been
noticed. Due to the complexity of events some entries have zero value in
one or more of their categories. While these zeroed values have not been
considered, the rest of numerical values are effective measures of major events
occurred in the UCTE power grid and, consequently, they have all been
included in order to develop the analysis presented in this paper.
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3. Probability distribution analysis
The study of the statistics and dynamics of series of events with ap-
proximate global models has been one of the most popular topics in the last
twenty years, specially within the interdisciplinary study of complex systems.
Probability distribution functions with a heavy tailed dependence in terms
of event or object sizes seem to be ubiquitous statistical features of self-
organized natural and social complex systems [7]. The appearance of alge-
braic distributions, specially power laws, is often thought to be the signature
of hierarchy, robustness, criticality and universal underlying mechanisms [8].
Electric power transmission networks have not escaped this captivation for
power laws quest. Time series of usual measures of blackout size like energy
unserved, power loss or number of customers affected, have been shown to
be algebraically distributed in North America [9], Sweden [10], Norway [11],
New Zealand [12] and China [13]. This apparent ubiquitous evidence have
led to believe and try to demonstrate that power systems (a) tend to self-
organize near a critical point and (b) that there may be some universality
ruling the inner depths of these systems.
In spite of this evidence, most of the aforementioned literature rely on
poorly performed statistical analysis and results can not be trusted. In some
cases methodologies are not clearly explained (i.e., Ref.[11]) or simple visual
inspection can clearly dismiss the analysis performed to rule in the power law
hypothesis (i.e., Ref.[10] and Ref.[13]). In other cases, proper usage of statis-
tical tools have given new results that limit the scope of the original analysis
(i.e., Ref.[9] is dismissed as insufficiently substantiated in Ref.[16] and rean-
alyzed in Ref.[5], finding moderate support for the power law hypothesis and
even some for an exponential distribution).
In this section we analyze the probability distributions of three malfunc-
tion measures of the European power grid: energy not supplied (ENS), total
loss of power (TLP) and restoration time (RT). The results are summarized
in Table 1 and shown in Figure 1. The methodology that has been used is
that described in Ref.[5], where a maximum likelihood approach is proposed
to estimate the heavy tailed function from the data and a significance test is
constructed for testing the plausibility of the power law. Measures shown in
Table 1 are generic statistics on one side and results of the aforementioned
statistical analysis on the other. The analysis of the power law distributed
data has been performed in the following way. We assume a quantity x fol-
lows a (continuous) power law distribution if it is drawn from a probability
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Maximum likelihood
Data set n 〈x〉 σ xmax xˆmin αˆ ntail p Support for PL
ENS 690 552 7004 180000 185±72 1.7±0.1 104±120 0.24 Moderate
TLP 576 400 1790 26746 615±244 2.1±0.2 57±96 0.36 Moderate
RT 897 510 3328 44640 150±68 1.69±0.07 157±115 0.73 Ok
Table 1: UCTE major events generic statistics and power law fits. For each measure we
give the number of occurrences n, mean 〈x〉, standard deviation σ, maximum observed
occurrence xmax, lower bound to the power law behavior xˆmin, scaling parameter value
αˆ, occurrences in the power law tail ntail and p value p. The last column indicates the
support for whether the observed data is well approximated by a power-law distribution.
Estimated uncertainties for xˆmin, αˆ and ntail are also shown.
density p(x) such that p(x) ∝ x−α, where α is the scaling parameter of the
distribution. Since the probability density of a power law distribution di-
verges as x → 0, there must exist a lower bound to the power law behavior
[16]. We denote this lower bound as xmin and the number of events contained
in the upper range as ntail.
In order to estimate both parameters α and xmin, we first use the max-
imum likelihood estimator for the scaling parameter for the continuous ap-
proximation, which is defined as
αˆ = 1 + n
[
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin
]−1
(1)
where xi, i = 1, ..., n, are the observed values of x such that xi ≥ xmin. The
former estimator depends on xmin and its value is not known a priori. Before
calculating αˆ, we need to first discard all samples below this point so that
we are left with only those for which the power-law model is valid. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic is used in this sense, which is defined as
the maximum distance D between the cumulative distribution functions of
the data S(x) and the fitted model P (x):
D = max
x≥xmin
|S(x)− P (x)| (2)
Our estimate xˆmin is the value of xmin that minimizes D.
Given an observed data set and a hypothesized power-law distribution
from which the data are drawn, one second step is knowing whether the power
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions P (x) and their maximum likelihood power law
fits (discontinuous straight line) for the UCTE reliability measures energy not supplied,
total loss of power and restoration time.
law hypothesis is a plausible one. The aforementioned KS statistic is used
again as a goodness-of-fit test between real data and synthetically generated
power-law distributed data. Each synthetic data set is fitted individually to
its own power-law model and the KS statistic for each one relative to its own
model is calculated. The fraction of the time that the resulting statistic is
larger than the value for the empirical data is the p-value that we are looking
for. It denotes the significance test result and quantifies the plausibility of
the hypothesis. The power law is ruled out if p ≤ 0.1.
As we can see in Table 1, the power law model is a plausible one for every
data set considered (i.e., the p-value for the best fit is sufficiently large) and
the scaling parameter values are similar to those encountered in the literature
for the ENS and TLP distributions [4, 14]. Yet the power law model explains
only a small amount of events: 15% for ENS (ntail = 104), less than 10%
for TLP (ntail = 57) and 17% for RT (ntail = 157) (even though it holds the
better fit, with p = 0.73). We believe that measures such as ntail and xmin are
fundamental to estimate the span of the power law behavior and to develop
further quantitative models, yet these values have not been considered in any
of the aforementioned references. Only in the reanalysis of Ref.[9] done in
Ref.[5] we have found an estimate for ntail that gives an explanation for a
28% of the events.
We assume that the limited span of available data in each set might have
a sensible influence in the final power law fitting outcome. It is nonetheless
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log-normal exponential Weibull PL + cut off
Data set LR p LR p LR p LR p
ENS -0.405 0.68 2.64 0.00 -0.393 0.69 -0.419 0.36
TLP 0.319 0.75 3.42 0.00 0.467 0.64 -0.08 0.68
RT -0.382 0.70 7.57 0.00 -0.329 0.74 -1.7 0.06
Table 2: Test of power-law behavior. Positive values of the likelihood ratios LR favors
the power law model. Values of p ≥ 0.1 imply though that result can not be trusted.
The exponential distribution is definitely ruled out as possible model and only for the
restoration time RT, the power law with cut off could be considered a valid model.
evident from these results that (a) power law behavior can not be assumed
for the whole data observed, (b) we can not accept the existence of any
critical point at this stage of the data span and (c) there must be right now
considerably more dynamics not explained by the power law model.
Following Ref.[5], as a third and final step, and in order to check if other
distributions may be a better fit, a likelihood ratio (LR) test has been per-
formed. The essential idea behind the LR test is to compute the likelihood of
the data under two competing distributions. The one with the higher likeli-
hood is then the better fit. Since the sign of the LR alone do not definitively
indicate which model is the better fit (because it is subject to statistical
fluctuation), we estimate the size of the expected fluctuations (i.e., standard
deviation) using Vuong’s method [17]. This method gives a new p-value that
tells us whether the observed sign of the LR is statistically significant. Like-
lihood ratios and p-values results with respect to log-normal, exponential,
stretched exponential (Weibull) and power law with cut off distributions are
shown in Table 2. Positive likelihood values favor the power law hypothesis
and p-values higher than 0.1 imply no significance on the results. Log-normal,
Weibull and exponential distributions can be ruled out since p ≥ 0.1 in the
first two and p = 0 in the latter with positive LR values. Power law with cut
off can be ruled out in the ENS and TLP data sets though it is a plausible
option for the RT data set.
4. Summary and discussion
Power outages are considered unexpected phenomena in power grids.
They appear without warning and, though widely investigated, there is not a
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common accepted theory that explains neither their pervasiveness nor their
inner dynamics. The statistical overabundance of big blackouts has been ex-
plained using theories of systems failure able to reproduce their empirically
found probability distribution. This distribution is considered a power law
for most of the literature encountered, with the consequences that this al-
gebraic tail involves (i.e., self-organization, criticality and universalities). In
order to add one more reference to this field, in this paper we have analyzed
seven years of disturbances data for the UCTE power grid and for three ma-
jor event measures: energy not supplied, total loss of power and restoration
time. Although evidences for self-organized criticality have been suggested
for even such as a short time span as five years of data [15], the results pre-
sented in this paper support the power law hypothesis moderately and only
for two (ENS and TLP) of the three measures considered. Moreover, the
amount of events explained by the power law hypothesis can be considered
negligible. These facts make it difficult to accept the existence of an equilib-
rium point near criticality for the UCTE power grid, at least at this stage
of data analysis, and it also suggests that most of the power grid dynamics
should be explained by different dynamical models, other than those that
generate power laws as their statistical outcome.
There still exist many complexities not explained in this systems. Ongo-
ing research is now focused in analyzing major events probability distribu-
tions in connection with (a) the reasons that trigger these major events and
(b) the structure and topology of the power grids involved in these major
malfunctions. Results will be published elsewhere.
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